Aristotle and Other Platonists by Lloyd P. Gerson

Author:Lloyd P. Gerson [Gerson, Lloyd P.]
Language: eng
Format: epub, pdf
Publisher: Cornell University Press
Published: 2017-08-28T04:00:00+00:00

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1. See Nuyens 1948, 48.

2. Ibid., 57.

3. Ibid., 58. Jaeger 1948, 332–334, claims that “the third book of On the Soul [De Anima], which contains the doctrine of Nous, stands out as peculiarly Platonic and not very scientific. This doctrine is an old and permanent element of Aristotle’s philosophy, one of the main roots of his metaphysics.” But Jaeger thinks that this ‘element’ does not cohere with the empirical psychology, which “belongs to another stage of development—in fact, to another dimension of thought.” Nuyens 1948, 219–220, argues against Jaeger that Book Γ’s account of νoυ̑ς can be integrated with the rest of the work so long as the agent intellect is eliminated from the functioning of intellect in the soul (296–310).

4. See esp. Block 1961; Hardie 1964; Lefèvre 1972; Charlton 1987; Wedin 1988; Frede 1992; Cohen 1992; Dancy 1996. Shields (1988, 106) attributes to Aristotle a doctrine he dubs ‘supervenient dualism.’ As Robinson 1991, 210–212, shows, however, ‘supervenience’ cannot plausibly be supposed to characterize Aristotle’s account of intellect. In addition, hylomorphism understood as supervenience solves no problem posed by dualism.

5. See Blumenthal 1990 for a survey of the background to the Neoplatonic commentaries on De Anima. Blumenthal is highly critical of the interpretive value of these commentaries. See also Blumenthal 1981.

6. De An. B 1, 412b5–6.

7. Hippolytus (d. ca. 235 C.E.) Refutation of all Heresies I 20: “In practically all matters Aristotle is in harmony (συμφωνός) with Plato, except for his teaching regarding the soul. For Plato says that the soul is immortal, whereas Aristotle says that [ . . . ] remains and after this to be dissipated into the fifth element.” Despite the evident lacuna in the text indicated by the brackets, it is clear that Hippolytus understands the basis for the anomalous disagreement between Aristotle and Plato to be in the matter of immortality. But Hippolytus, who is in this work generally concerned to identify various Christian heresies with different pagan philosophical schools, is not especially interested in anything like a clear or nuanced appreciation of the ancient texts. Later in the work (VII 19, 5–6) he says ruefully that it is not possible to say what Aristotle’s doctrine of the soul is in De Anima. He adds that the definition of the soul given by Aristotle requires ‘great study.’ For a valuable account of Hippolytus’s treatment of Aristotle see Osborne 1987, 35–67. Eusebius in his Preparation for the Gospel XV 9, 14, 1–5, quotes the Platonist Atticus (2nd century C.E.) as saying something similar. Atticus, however, adds that whereas Aristotle holds that intellect can exist apart from soul, Plato holds that it cannot: ῾O μὲν γάρ φήσι νoυ̑ν ἅνευ ψυχη̑ς ἀδύνατον εἰ̑ναι συνίστασθαι, ὁ δὲ χωρίζεει τη̑ς ψυχη̑ς τὸν voυ̑ν. καὶ τὸ τη̑ς ἀθανασίας. ὁ μὲν μετὰ τη̑ς ψυχη̑ς αὐτῳ̑ δίδωσιν, ὡς ἅλλως οὐκ ἐνδεχόμενον, ὁ δέ φήσιν αὐτῳ̑ μόνῳ χωριζομένῳ τη̑ς ψυχη̑ς τoυ̑τo περιγίνεσθαι. (“For the one [Plato] says that it is impossible for intellect to exist without soul, while the other [Aristotle]

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